

**Tenth Annual NATO Conference
on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation**

**Interlaken,
Grand Hotel Victoria-Jungfrau
23-24 June 2014**

Introductory remarks by Ambassador Balázs Csuday for Panel 1:

“The future of multilateral non-proliferation regimes and initiatives”

1. A changing disarmament architecture – challenges to the NPT

In 1963 president Kennedy expressed fear that by the 1970s, there might be 15, 20 or even 25 states possessing nuclear weapons.¹ Now, in 2014, most luckily, this does not seem to be the case. Thanks in part to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the number of “haves” is below ten. The case of Iran and North Korea, however, seems to prove right the voices about the threat of proliferation. [Although new hopes arise now on the horizon with promising E3+3 and expert level negotiations progressing towards a potential final agreement on the long debated Iranian nuclear dossier.](#)

Whilst the number of US and Russian nuclear warheads has been reduced substantially, there is no doubt that there is still a lot to disarm.

Both disarmament and non-proliferation require our attention and relentless efforts now, as well as in the future. It is promising that there is a goal we all seem to share: we would like to live in a world free of nuclear weapons.

How do we get there? Promoting legal order, a culture of compliance with existing obligations and encouraging further international disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations are our major tools.

The NPT is usually referred to as the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and that is for good reasons. Despite the fact that it is under pressure because of the lack of universality and the architecture itself is still lacking important pillars, the NPT has functioned adequately.

Non-compliance with treaty obligations and the perceived lack of progress in disarmament, strangely, undermine the credibility of the treaty instead of giving the blame to the “culprits”. This is no doubt a dangerous development. Some may believe that the door is open to pursue nuclear armament programmes, while others begin to look for alternative avenues to advance disarmament. It is clear that the frustration over the perceived lack of progress in nuclear

¹ „I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.” News Conference 52, March 21, 1963

disarmament is reaching a critical amount. ...In the hope of many at least. In this regard, as it has already been announced officially, hosting the next conference in December this year on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, represents a major challenge for Austria to keep the delicate balance between adversary parties of the conference. While clearly engaging itself for the issue it seems to be highly desirable for Vienna to take a moderate position, keeping a careful eye on its symbolic and leading status in a number of existing disarmament initiatives.

Is there really a revolution in nuclear disarmament hanging in the air? I don't think we are there yet, or in fact, anywhere close to a collapse of the edifice of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, regimes and initiatives.

The conduct and the outcome of the last NPT PrepCom were smooth and caused no surprises: debates on all three pillars of the NPT were substantive, less heated than last year. Well-known positions were heard over again, the debate did not seem to deepen the existing divisions or create new ones among participants. Although there was no consensus on the Chairman's recommendations, there was no sense of drama in the air either.

Several international treaties have beneficial impacts on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, most prominently the NPT. A famous nuclear arms control treaty that is not yet in force but nevertheless unfolds effects is the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It is the basis of a strong norm against nuclear testing.

2. Perspectives of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

A treaty that does not yet exist is a treaty to limit or reduce the quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The FMCT can be seen as the quantitative counterpart of the CTBT, capping the amount of material available for new nuclear weapons.

An FMCT will have many benefits. It would at least be a theoretical symbol of an end to the arms race and would strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It is mandated to be a non-discriminatory arrangement, that is, rights and duties would be the same for all parties. Thus it will reduce the discrimination that is inherent in the NPT regime. Moreover, it may have the potential to draw in the states outside the NPT.

The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established by the UN General Assembly (UNGA 67, 2012) to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a treaty banning production of fissile material has begun its work in Geneva in April.

The first session of the GGE engaged in serious discussions on some technical issues against the background of the broader political context in which the GGE operates. Despite differing views on a number of issues there were similarities and few issues only where positions diverged significantly.

No doubt considerable work needs to be done before the GGE presents its report to the UN Secretary General in 2015. The recommendations are intended to serve as reference for future negotiators hopefully beginning their work soon after the GGE has finished its own.

3. *The “Vienna Issues”: a prominent role for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)*

In my capacity as Article XIV coordinator, among the major “Vienna issues”, allow me to keep the focus on the CTBT.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, banning all nuclear-weapon tests, is one of the most critical mechanisms to halt the nuclear arms race. It represents one of the most important steps towards a nuclear weapons free world. Closing the door on the destabilizing and dangerous practice of nuclear testing requires transforming the de-facto international norm against nuclear testing into an enforceable legally binding instrument. Furthermore, in order to move towards multilateral disarmament involving all the nuclear armed States, it is imperative that the CTBT enters into force.

Unlike the NPT, the CTBT does not differentiate between haves and have-nots. It imposes a legally binding verification mechanism upon both Non-Nuclear Weapon States and Nuclear Weapon States, an unprecedented evolution within the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

3.1. CTBT versus NPT, risks of a diminishing attention

History reveals clear linkages between the CTBT and the NPT. The two Treaties are mutually reinforcing each-other, and an erosion of support for either of them will inevitably result in the detriment of both. Eloquent expressions of support for the CTBT and its entry into force within the NPT review process and other multilateral fora will not suffice to ensure a future for the Treaty and the CTBT. It is time to put words into action, and action into results.

We must also be careful not to diminish the strong message of universal responsibility for achieving the Treaty’s entry into force. Just as the implementation of Article VI of the NPT is the responsibility of ALL STATES, the early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty is not only the task of the nuclear-weapon States, but that of all NPT States Parties.

Let me recall that the 2015 NPT Review Conference will mark twenty years since the decision to indefinitely extend the NPT, ensuring that it remains the cornerstone of global disarmament and non-proliferation arrangements. A key part of the bargain in this indefinite extension was the conclusion of negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Five years later, the 2000 NPT Review Conference designated entry into force of the CTBT as the first of 13 practical steps to achieving nuclear disarmament. Since then, the sense among some seems to be that with a global test ban *‘in operation’* if not *‘in effect’*, there is no

need to keep the foot on the pedal. This is a very risky approach to take. Until the Treaty is legally locked in, there will always be the chance of going back to the days of nuclear testing. That in turn would have grave repercussions for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In these circumstances, handling CTBT in a “*business as usual manner*” would be a major mistake.

Even in advance of ratification, engaging on technical issues can also create momentum. The decision by China to send data from key International Monitoring System (IMS) stations can be seen in this light. Not only does the data from these Chinese stations significantly enhance the regional and global coverage of the IMS, it also clearly demonstrates China’s dedication to the CTBT.

The most important mission of the CTBT is to provide the confidence that no nuclear test can go undetected. When North Korea announced its nuclear tests, the CTBT verification regime proved its worth, detecting the tests reliably and confidently.

3.2. Middle-East Interferences, IFE 14, NWFZ

The CTBT can serve as a regional confidence and security building measure. Ratification of the Treaty by States in the Middle East, in particular the Annex 2 countries Egypt, Iran and Israel, would be a positive catalyst for other security-related issues affecting the region. The CTBT can play an important role as a confidence-building and transparency measure in the Middle East.

The Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) to be held in Jordan at the end of this year, involving over 100 participants from across the region and the world, is a major contribution to the promotion of the Treaty in the Middle East. Such activities are of particular value given the developments in the region: be it chemical weapons in Syria or the Iranian nuclear program. Jordan’s efforts to ensure the success of the IFE14 will contribute to the process towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The development of nuclear energy programs for peaceful purposes as enshrined under Article IV of the NPT is totally incompatible with nuclear testing. In fact, nuclear testing undermines confidence in a state’s intentions. The reverse is equally true. By signing and ratifying the CTBT, states increase confidence in their peaceful nuclear programs. The CTBT thus provides the last and clearly visible barrier between the two, contributing to the build-up of confidence in the region. An increased support for the CTBT in the Middle East could pave the way for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region, advancing the ultimate goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

There is a strong complimentary force between Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) and the CTBT. While the CTBT has not yet achieved legal international standing, it is already effectively in force in all of the States covered by existing NWFZs. As such, the CTBT provides a powerful verification mechanism to NWFZs. Moreover, ratification of the CTBT

by countries that are not yet covered by NWFZs, such as those in the Middle East, can serve as powerful confidence and security building measures aimed at creating the right conditions for the establishment of such a zone.

The conduct IFE14 in Jordan will demonstrate the progress the CTBTO made since the previous field test in 2008. IFE14 will test crucial aspects of all inspection phases in an integrated manner and assess progress with the development of OSI procedures and techniques.

IFE14 will help to gain enhanced political support for further development of the OSI regime and the promotion of the CTBT. By developing and testing the OSI regime, the CTBTO can further demonstrate that the Treaty is verifiable, thus facilitating the decision to join the CTBT to those countries who are yet to do so, particularly the remaining Annex 2 countries.

3.3. An innovative approach: The Group of Eminent Persons (GEM)

When taking up Article XIV presidency, we were in agreement with the assessment of the then newly appointed executive secretary Dr. Lassina Zerbo, that the advocacy of the early entry into force of the CTBT may no longer sufficiently be assured by the instrument of the Article XIV Conferences and Ministerial Meetings, rather it needs to be strengthened by some additional measures. Therefore, since the beginning, we have most warmly commanded his initiative to establish a group of high profile personalities that are in a position to efficiently represent and further promote the ratification of the CTBT.

I am happy to have assisted at the very birth of this eminent group last September in the premises of our Permanent Mission in New York. I am confident that the endeavors of the Group of Eminent Persons will contribute to a reinforced dialogue with important stakeholders in the remaining Annex II countries. We consider that the activities of the GEM and those of the Article XIV coordinators can and should be planned on a complementary basis. A thorough and regular coordination between us is indispensable, even imperative to secure a smooth and fruitful cooperation for the sake of the same cause.

We consider the latest meeting of the Group in Stockholm on 10-11 April a successful-one that was able to determine some basic guidelines for the future of the Group in general and also to outline concrete and imminent actions to be taken individually by its members. Since the reference in a very positive tone to the GEM in the Final Declaration of the last G7 meeting in Brussels – which is obviously a result of the intervention of some GEM members – there is no longer any doubt over the potential of these eminent persons, experts, and scientists to exert a beneficial impact, rather to be able *to influence* high ranking political decision-makers. And this is the main reason to keep this initiative alive and further unfold its capacities.

4. The future of Nuclear Security Summits

The leading role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in questions related to nuclear security has once more been confirmed by the Conference on Nuclear Security convened by the IAEA in Vienna last July and so, it is more than right to consider nuclear security too as a prominent “Vienna issue”. Hungary was particularly honoured to have been requested to preside over that conference.

One of the main achievements of the IAEA conference was the adoption by consensus by all member states of the IAEA of a first ever Ministerial Declaration. The Conference resulted in substantive agreements on the need for maintaining highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection in all states. The broad consensus and the demonstrated political will among IAEA Member States to ensure effective nuclear security throughout the world have underlined the importance of inclusiveness. This notion has played a key role in turning the conference into a success.

While there is consensus that responsibility for nuclear security continues to rest with the states concerned, the NSS process has been an excellent example of effective international cooperation, which greatly facilitates national efforts with regard to mitigating the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The NSS process, in a mere four years, resulted in high level political commitments to strengthen nuclear security and brought about tangible achievements with respect to such important issues as the reduction of civilian Highly Enriched Uranium and plutonium stockpiles.

While believing that even stronger political commitment and tangible results with respect to strengthening global nuclear security are needed, the NSS process seems to gain a growing importance in the future.

There is an emerging broad consensus in the world that strengthening nuclear security is a top priority for all states and that, over time, it should be embedded in their national security strategies. There is also a growing recognition of the added value of bilateral, regional and international cooperation in nuclear security and that there is still much to be done. Looking to the future, we also have to build on the success of the three nuclear summit meetings of an increasing number of states where political, technical and legal commitments are being made and honored.

As Governments remain concerned about the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism, and as they commit themselves to strengthen the security of the citizens of their countries, it is imperative to pursue all avenues, national and international efforts alike. In this regard, the NSS process could remain as an option for its continuation in the interest of strengthened nuclear security worldwide.