

CTBT Diplomacy and Public Policy Course

Remarks by Ambassador Balázs Csuday to Panel Discussion “Challenges of achieving entry into Force”

Tuesday 2 September 2014

10.00 – 11.30

VIC, Board room C

I. RISKS A OF A DIMINISHING ATTENTION FOR THE CTBT

The current situation of no potential Annex-II ratifications on the horizon represents a crucial challenge for the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO: the question is how long we will be able to secure the appropriate financial means for a credible and sustainable verification regime.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference designated entry into force of the CTBT as the first of 13 practical steps to achieving nuclear disarmament. It has been too long since then, that the global test ban is *‘in operation’* but not *‘in effect’*.

The most important mission of the CTBT is to provide the confidence that no nuclear test can go undetected. When North Korea announced its nuclear tests, the CTBT verification regime proved its worth, detecting the tests reliably and confidently.

Nevertheless, the fact that the Treaty is operational may create the false impression that entry into force is not indispensable. This is a very risky approach to take. Until the Treaty is legally locked in, there will always be the chance of going back to the days of nuclear testing. That in turn would have grave repercussions for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In these circumstances, handling CTBT in a *“business as usual manner”* would be a major mistake.

II. THE ARTICLE XIV PROCESS AS A RESPONSE TO THE NEED OF AWARENESS-RAISING

1. Why Hungary as Article XIV coordinator?

The recent ratification in February 2012 by Indonesia made it a “natural candidate” for the Article XIV coordinatorship. But why Hungary? Let me recall just a few facts:

Hungary was among the first countries to sign and ratify the Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty and has since the beginning constantly reiterated its full support for the noble goals of the CTBT.

The organization was headed since 1 August 2005 by the Hungarian national Ambassador Tibor Tóth. He was re-elected in November 2008 and his mandate lasted until July 2013. This period was marked by events like the three nuclear tests in North Korea or the 2011

Fukushima disaster and by an impressive increase of completed and certified monitoring stations as well as by a remarkable number of new ratifications.

In the summer of 2013 the largest, two-week long Build-up Exercise preparing for the Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) to be held in Jordan at the end of this year, took place in Hungary. The IFE is essential to develop and keep up-to-date the On-Site Inspection capacities stipulated by the Treaty. Before the large Build-up Exercise, several OSI training courses and field tests were also hosted by Hungary. Hungary has made a significant contribution in-kind for the IFE.

2. Basic principles of outreach

After having adopted the Final Declaration of the Article XIV Conference last summer, the coordinators immediately started planning their comprehensive outreach activity. To order a large number of various activities in a structured way they have drafted a document called “Action Plan” that was published by the CTBTO Secretariat among all member states last December.

The main objectives set by this document are to advance progress towards universalization and entry into force through country-specific initiatives that facilitate the ratification.

Outreach is carried out towards the 27 States (outside Annex 2) which have not either signed or ratified the Treaty. A target of 170 ratifications of the CTBT by the 2015 Article XIV Conference is set – in respect of the actual 162 ratifications.

High level events and major conferences are utilized as “target” events to advance universality. Let me just mention the most important such events to take place this year: the 2014 NPT PrepCom, the 2014 PrepCom of the Conference of the States Parties and Signatories that establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, the 2014 Friends of the CTBT Ministerial Meeting and the 2014 UN General Assembly high level session.

Beyond this, a list of other important multilateral meetings has been drawn up where engagement with high-level and other decision makers on the margins of these events should include reference to the importance of the CTBT ratification and early entry into force.

Increased efforts are undertaken to engage decision makers in the remaining 8 Annex 2 States. This strategy implies contacts, at the highest possible political level, as well as progress in addressing and resolving regional and other non-proliferation issues like the DPRK, Iran, India-Pakistan, and Middle-East.

As ratification at a final phase is largely dealt with by national parliaments, while carrying out our Article XIV tasks we lay a particular emphasis on parliamentary diplomacy for the promotion of the CTBT. We would like to make sure that parliamentarians raise the issue of the promotion of the Treaty in their contacts with their foreign colleagues, in particular from African, Arab, and Asian States which have not yet ratified the Treaty. In this regard, let me recall that the latest Assembly of the Inter-parliamentary Union held in Geneva in March this

year adopted a resolution entitled “Towards a Nuclear Weapon free World: the contribution of parliaments”.

3. A complementary tool: the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM)

To ensure an innovative and focused approach in advancing the CTBT’s ratification, following suite to a personal initiative by the executive secretary, a group comprising eminent personalities and internationally recognized experts was launched in the margins of last year’s Article XIV Conference. Through their expertise, experience and political standing, this Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) is intended to support and complement efforts to promote the Treaty’s entry into force as well as reinvigorate international endeavors to achieve this goal. The foreign ministers of Hungary and Indonesia, Mr. Tibor Navracsics and Mr. Marty Natalegawa are ex officio members of the GEM, while Mr. János Martonyi, previous minister of foreign affairs of Hungary is a steady member.

We consider that the activities of the GEM and those of the Article XIV coordinators can and should be planned on a complementary basis. A thorough and regular coordination between us is indispensable, even imperative to secure a smooth and fruitful cooperation for the sake of the same cause.

The latest meeting of the Group in Stockholm on 10-11 April was a successful-one that was able to determine some basic guidelines for the future of the Group in general and also to outline concrete and imminent actions to be taken individually by its members. Since the reference in a very positive tone to the GEM in the Final Declaration of the last G7 meeting in Brussels – which is obviously a result of the intervention of some GEM members – there is no longer any doubt over the potential of the these eminent persons, experts, and scientists to exert a strong conclusive impact, rather to be able *to influence* high ranking political decision-makers. And this is the main raison to keep this initiative alive and further unfold its capacities.

4. Flagship events of the Action Plan

Indonesia undertook to organize a regional seminar for countries from South-east Asia and the Pacific in Jakarta which took place on 19-20 May 2014.

Hungary intends to organize a similar event early next year reaching out to African countries. Exact date, location and modalities of this seminar are currently under elaboration.

[Ha addig jóváhagyják: Hungary is ready to host the next meeting of the Group of Eminent Persons in Budapest later this year, early November which would be a good opportunity for the Group to take stock of the outcomes of the CTBT Ministerial Meeting in 2014 September and to start planning the Group’s Activities for 2015. In Budapest the work started at the latest GEM meeting in Stockholm will also be carried on further specifying, articulating and structuring the activities of the group’s individual members.]

5. The contribution of the European Union to the CTBTO

As the Article XIV co-president from the northern hemisphere, representing a Member State of the European Union let me recall that the EU lobbied hard for entry into force since the very beginning. The EU has been a traditional key supporter of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, both politically and financially.

The European Union contributes around 40 percent of the organization's budget and has provided over 15 million euro in voluntary contributions. So, for us as Europeans it is a special moral imperative to do our best for the promotion of the Treaty.

Between 2006 and 2012 the financial support of the EU has also materialized in the adoption of five EU Joint Actions, recently called "*Council Decisions*".

The generous support of the EU considerably enhanced the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO and underlined the credibility of the CTBT verification regime.

The support was used, for a wide scope of programs. Let me mention just a few from the most significant-ones:

- the establishment of an E-learning training program;
- support to the Integrated Field Exercise in 2008 in respect of On-Site Inspections;
- support to Radio-Xenon Assessment and Measurement projects ;
- technical assistance to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean;
- support to auxiliary seismic stations ;
- strengthening cooperation with the scientific community;
- strengthening the On-Site Inspection capabilities with the development of a noble gas detection system;

The sixth such financial instrument is currently under elaboration. The new EU Council Decision should be envisaged as a follow-up to the activities undertaken in the previous EU funding activities and also as an introduction of new projects in critical areas particularly in the field of new technologies allowing the development of a financially more sustainable monitoring system.

A reliable and effective verification regime is in fact a key element in persuading the few remaining states to sign and ratify the Treaty and deter any State to test.

6. A regional approach – focus on the Middle-East

The CTBT can serve as a regional confidence and security building measure. Ratification of the Treaty by States in the Middle East, in particular the Annex 2 countries Egypt, Iran and

Israel, would be a positive catalyst for other security-related issues affecting the region. The CTBT can play an important role as a confidence-building and transparency measure in the Middle East.

The Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) to be held in Jordan at the end of this year, involving over 100 participants from across the region and the world, is a major contribution to the promotion of the Treaty in the Middle East. Such activities are of particular value given the developments in the region: be it chemical weapons in Syria or controversies of the Iranian nuclear program. Jordan's efforts to ensure the success of the IFE14 will contribute to the process towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

An increased support for the CTBT in the Middle East could pave the way for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region, advancing the ultimate goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

There is a strong complimentary force between Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) and the CTBT. While the CTBT has not yet achieved legal international standing, it is already effectively in force in all of the States covered by existing NWFZs. As such, the CTBT provides a powerful verification mechanism to NWFZs. Moreover, ratification of the CTBT by countries that are not yet covered by NWFZs, such as those in the Middle East, can serve as powerful confidence and security building measures aimed at creating the right conditions for the establishment of such a zone.

The conduct IFE14 in Jordan will demonstrate the progress the CTBTO made since the previous field test in 2008. IFE14 will test crucial aspects of all inspection phases in an integrated manner and assess progress with the development of On-site Inspection (OSI) procedures and techniques.

IFE14 will help to gain enhanced political support for further development of the OSI regime and the promotion of the CTBT. By developing and testing the OSI regime, the CTBTO can further demonstrate that the Treaty is verifiable, thus facilitating the decision to join the CTBT to those countries who are yet to do so, particularly the remaining Annex 2 countries. An eventual success of a UN conference on a Middle-East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone to be held until the next NPT RevCon would also have an immense beneficial impact.